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NOTES
ADmISSIBILITY OF ASSESSED VALUE IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
When private property is taken for public use, the property
owner is constitutionally entitled to "just compensation." 1 The
determination of the justness of compensation is a judicial question,2
subject to legislative regulation only if such regulation provides at
least a constitutionally required minimum award.3  American
case law uniformly indicates that market value of the land at the
time of appropriation is the proper measure of compensation.4
Of the varied evidence which is presented to the court to assist
in the determination of market value, no item has given courts
greater difficulty or resulted in a wider spectrum of authority
than evidence of real estate tax assessment. The purpose of this
comment is to survey divergent views and evaluate their rationales
in order to postulate a logical and practicable doctrine governing
the admissibility of evidence of tax assessment in condemnation
cases.
The Spectrum of Authority
The weight of authority holds that assessed value is not
competent direct evidence of value for purposes other than tax-
ation.5  Some jurisdictions allow its admission only as some
evidence of value, insufficient in itself to support a finding of
market value; in others it is admissible for the limited purpose of
impeaching the credibility of the condemnee's testimony. (These
rules are discussed infra.) This reluctance to give the assessment
full weight is explained as the result of judicial recognition that
property is rarely assessed at market value. In many states,
it has been held that assessments are inadmissible because of their
notorious unreliability in spite of constitutional or statutory re-
quirements that all property be assessed at market value or some
IE.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).2 Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893).
34 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.1 [3], at 33 (rev. 3d ed. 1962).
4 Id. at § 12.2. In cases where the application of this measure would be
unjust, it is not employed. JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN 102-03 (1953).
5 Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 209, 214 (1955).
equivalent thereoL6 In ignoring these requirements that assessments
must be at market value, an important reason put forth by the
courts is that assessed value is used solely for the purpose of
taxation and is not a fair criterion of market value in condemnation
proceedings. 7  The assessor is said to be concerned with relative
and not absolute values, seeking only to distribute tax burdens
reasonably. In such jurisdictions, testimony as to the accuracy
of the assessed valuation or the ratio of assessed value to market
value does not make the evidence admissible.8
Another frequently advanced rationale for the exclusion of
evidence of tax assessment when only the assessment rolls are
offered in evidence is that they represent only an ex parte opinion,
not subject to cross-examination.9 This position ignores the doctrine
that public records are entitled to that confidence which requires
no cross-examination. 10 In addition, it seems inconsistent with
the generally accepted doctrine that assessors, as sworn public
officers, are presumed to have done their duty of placing a fair
market value on all realty." Finally, where the assessor is an
opinion witness at trial, this position is untenable.
When the condemnor cannot be identified with the assessor,
evidence of assessed valuation has been held inadmissible as res
inter alios acta, i.e., binding only as between the assessor and the
assessed.'2 This rule has been applied most strictly in Oklahoma
where it has been held that the evidence is not admissible except
between the assessor and the assessed for tax purposes.13 More
generally, however, the rule is not applied when both the assessor
and the condemnor are agents or representative bodies of state or
local government. 14
8 E.g., St Louis, I. M. & So. Ry. v. Magness, 93 Ark 46, 123 S.W. 786
(1909) ; San Jose & A. R.R v. Mayne, 83 Cal. 566, 23 Pac. 522 (1890) ; Ft.
Collins Dev. Ry. v. France, 41 Colo. 512, 92 Pac. 953 (1907); In re North-
lake Ave., 96 Wash. 344, 165 Pac. 113 (1917). In the majority of states,
there are requirements, either constitutional or statutory, that real property
be assessed at "market," "actual," "cash," or "full" value. Note, Tax Assess-
ments of Real Property: A Proposal for Legislative Reforn, 68 YALE LJ.
335, 386 (1958) (appendix).
7 City of Chicago v. Harrison-Halsted Bldg. Corp., 11 Ill. 2d 431, 143
N.E.2d 40 (1957).8 Kansas City & G. Ry. v. Haake, 331 Mo. 429, 53 S.W.2d 891 (1932).
Cf. American State Bank v. Butts, 111 Wash. 612, 191 Pac. 754 (1920).
9 Girard Trust Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 248 Pa. 179, 93 Atl. 947
(1915); Bergen County Sewer Auth. v. Borough of Little Ferry, 15 N.J.
Super. 43, 83 A.2d 4 (1951).
10 Ripley v. Spaulding, 116 Vt 531, 80 A.2d 375 (1951).
"1 People ex rel. Wallington Apartments, Inc. v. Miller, 288 N.Y. 31, 41
N.E.2d 445 (1942).
22 Suffolk & C. Ry. v. West End Land & Improvement Co., 137 N.C. 330,
49 S.E. 350 (1904).
"Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Malone, 179 Olda. 449, 66 P.2d 5 (1937).
14Coffee County v. Marsh, 209 Ala. 566, 96 So. 891 (1923).
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Some jurisdictions, which emphasize that tax assessments
are unreliable because the property owner has not participated
in the valuation, admit such evidence where the owner values
his own property for the assessment or affirmatively assents to
the assessment. In effect, the owner's assent is treated as a
declaration against interest, admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule.' 5 The evidence is thus used against the owner
when he seeks to establish a higher value for condemnation than
be has previously assented to for taxation. Such evidence has
been admitted to contradict the owner's testimony as to value
or to impeach his credibility upon cross-examination," to serve as
independent evidence of value for the consideration of the finder
of fact,'7 or to effect a complete estoppel against the owner-
complainant.'
There is some conflict of authority as to what degree of
owner participation is required in order to render the assessment
admissible. It has been held that the mere fact that the owner
permits the proper official to assess and thereafter pays the taxes,
without objection or resort to appellate procedure, is not sufficient
to constitute an admission against interest.' 9  Some affirmative
act on the part of the owner, such as signing the assessment rolls
or submitting a tax return stating the value of the property, is
generally required.20  While there is some authority to the con-
trary, the owner's participation in the assessment need not be in
the form of a sworn statement to be sufficient for admissibility
in these jurisdictions.21
It would seem that if the owner is bound by an assessed valu-
ation because of prior ratification or other affirmative acts, the
condemnor should be similarly bound because of its participation
in the assessment. However, while there are exceptions, 22 most
15 Bowie Lumber Co. v. United States, 155 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1946);
Rountree Farm Co. v. Morgan County, 249 Ala. 472, 31 So. 2d 346 (1947);
Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 245 Iowa 763, 61 N.W.2d 687(1953); Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 253 S.W.2d 264 (Ky. 1952).
16In re United States Comm'n, 54 App. D.C. 129, 295 Fed. 950 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 598 (1924) ; Dean v. County Bd. of Educ., 210
Ala. 256, 97 So. 741 (1923); Welton v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 211
Iowa 625, 233 N.W. 876 (1930).
' 1United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 250 Fed. 299 (M.D. Ala. 1918);
Commonwealth v. Lanter, 364 S.W.2d 652 (Ky. 1963); Mayor & City Coun-
cil v. Himmel, 135 Md. 65, 107 Atl. 522 (1919).
18 Commonwealth v. Lanter, .mpra note 17.
19 Savannah, A. & M. Ry. v. Buford, 106 Ala. 303, 17 So. 395 (1895);
Kansas City & G. Ry. v. Haake, supra note 8.20 West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 738 (Ky.
1963) ; Mayor & City Council v. Himmel, supra note 17.21Ibid. But see Meridian Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sapkaris, 82 Ind. App.
272, 145 N.E. 784 (1924) (insurance).22 E.g., Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. Giaccone, 19 La. App. 446, 140 So.
286 (1932) (dicta); In re Site for Memorial Hall, 316 Mich. 215, 25
N.W2d 174 (1946).
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cases hold that assessed value is not an admission against interest
on the part of the condemnor.- 3  It is felt that the state or local
government cannot become bound in its capacity as condemnor
by the acts of an official representing the government in its capacity
as tax collector.
However, evidence of the assessed value has been admitted
for the limited purpose of impeaching or discrediting witnesses
of the owner or condemnor. The evidence has frequently been
permitted for use against expert witnesses, especially those of the
condemnor. Indeed, in some jurisdictions which prohibit the
admission of assessed value as evidence-in-chief, questions per-
taining to assessment may be asked upon cross-eCxamination if
contradiction or inconsistency in testimony might thereby be shown.
2 4
In contrast, other cases have held that evidence of assessed
valuation cannot be used to impeach an expert's opinion of market
value, since assessed valuation bears no relation to market value.
2 5
Statutes in some states authorize the admission of assessed
value in condemnation proceedings.28  Generally such statutes pro-
vide that it may be considered by the trier of fact as an element
in the determination of just compensation. The Louisiana Con-
stitution goes as far as to provide that lands used or destroyed
for levees or levee drainage purposes may not be compensated
for at a price exceeding the assessed value for the preceding
year
2 7
In jurisdictions which admit evidence of assessed value, what-
ever weight it is given, admission frequently depends upon how
recent the valuation is. 2s  In many states, assessments are not
reviewed periodically so that the original assessment may remain
on the property for many years. Where this is the case, new
buildings are more likely to be assessed at the actual value. Where
there has been material change in property values, the rule ex-
cluding assessed value remote in time seems proper.
2a Supra note 9. See also United States v. Certain Parcels of Land,
261 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1958).
24United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 48 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y.
1942) (assessor as witness) ; City of Los Angeles v. Deacon, 119 Cal. App.
491, 7 P.2d 378 (1932) (expert witness).
25 United States v. Delano Park Homes, Inc., 146 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1944)
(expert witness); Johnson & Wimsatt, Inc. v. Reichelderfer, 60 App. D.C.
186, 50 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (assessor as witness).
2
6ARK. STAT. ANN. §76-521 (1947); MAss. G=c. LAws ch. 79, § 35
(1932). See Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Snowden, 233 Ark. 565,
345 S.W.2d 917 (1961); Haven v. Town of Brimfield, 345 Mass. 529, 188
N.E.2d 574 (1963).
2 7 LA. CONST. art. 16, § 6. See Board of Comm'rs v. Franklin, 219 La.
859, 54 So. 2d 125, appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 844 (1951).
2S Miller v. Windsor Water Co., 148 Pa. 429, 23 AtI. 1132 (1892) ; In re
Site for Memorial Hall, supra note 22. But see Minneapolis-St. Paul Sani-
tary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 277 N.W. 394 (1937).
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New York
In New York there is authority for the admissibility of
assessed value as some evidence of market value in condemnation
cases.29 Such a holding is easily analogized to the well-established
rule that assessed valuation is properly considered a factor in
arriving at market value to determine the amount of the de-
ficiency judgment upon mortgage foreclosure.3 0  It also seems
consistent with the policy expressed in the statutory method of
determining commercial rental value for rent control purposes.3 1
Furthermore, all real property is required to be assessed at
full value.3 2  However, the decisions have not been uniform and
several recent decisions have made New York's position even
less certain.
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Grossman33 reviewed New
York precedent and found no authority for admissibility of assessed
valuation, but was persuaded by the "majority" rule against such
admissibility. It held that even though condemnation appraisers
were not bound by "technical rules of evidence," they should not
have considered assessed valuation. The court cited Ridley v.
Seaboard R.R. 4 and quoted:
'But the tax valuation being placed on the land by the tax assessors
without the intervention of the landowner, no inference that it is a
correct valuation can be drawn from his failure to except that the
valuation is too low. Such a valuation was res inter alios acta,
and is not competent against the plaintiff in -this action.' s
Subsequently, the issue was considered by the appellate division in
Matter of City of New York (2460 Jerome Ave. Realty Co.).3 6
In that case, the court ruled that assessed value must be considered
in arriving at the fair value of condemned property where there
29 Matter of Simmons, 132 App. Div. 574, 116 N.Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dep't
1909).36Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Ess Ess Realty Co., 273 App. Div. 775, 74
N.Y.S.2d 842 (2d Dep't 1947); Adler v. Berkowitz, 229 App. Div. 245, 240
N.Y. Supp. 597 (2d Depet 1930), inodified, 254 N.Y. 433, 173 N.E. 574 (1930) ;
First Nat'l Bank v. Goodman, 173 Misc. 562, 18 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct
1940).
31N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAWS § 8524(1) (a) (McKinney 1961).32 "Assessments shall in no case exceed full value." N.Y. CoNST. art.
XVI, § 2. "All real property in each assessing unit shall be assessed at the
full value thereof." N.Y. REAL PRor. TAx LAW § 306.33231 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct 1962).
- 124 N.C. 37, 32 S.E. 379 (1899).
35 Long Island Lighting Co. v. Grossman, 231 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (Supp.
Ct 1962).
36 18 App. Div. 2d 991, 238 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1st Dep't 1963). See also
Matter of City of New York, 8 App. Div. 2d 365, 187 N.Y.S2d 606 (1st
Dep't 1959), wherein assessed value was considered.,
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is no evidence of the rental value of the property in question
or the sale value of comparable properties. The court thus intimated
that only when other satisfactory evidence is not available should
assessed value be considered.
The significance of the admissibility and effect of assessed
value became apparent in Matter of City of New York (Lincoln
Square Slum Clearance Project) .7 The court considered the effect
of admissions contained in applications for writs of certiorari 83
to reduce tax assessment of the condemned realty. Where an
owner seeks to challenge the valuation as excessive, it is the
practice in New York to file with the assessor a notice of protest
within the time period provided by local ordinance.3 9  If no
relief is afforded by the assessor, judicial review may be sought.40
In this notice 4  and in the petition for judicial review of the
assessment, 42 the taxpayer must indicate the amount he believes
to be the full value of his property. Since the owner is bound
by his claimed value to the extent that a court may not give him
a greater reduction than he requests,43 owners tend to understate
the value of their property. This evidence, coupled with evidence
of assessed value, would thus frequently be detrimental to the owner
of condemned property. The court in Lincoln Square demonstrated
its awareness of this situation:
A certain degree of cynicism is no doubt warranted by the very general
practice of landowners who have applied for writs of putting down
estimates that vary widely from the claims that they make when the
property is about to be condemned. 44
While it did not condone this practice, the court felt that the
overriding consideration was the constitutional requirement that
the property owner receive just compensation. The court concluded
that the owner's assertion of value in the petition for review
of assessment is to be treated as an opinion, to be weighed by the
trier of fact along with the assessed value and other evidence.45
37 15 App Div. 2d 153, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'd inem.,
12 N.Y.2d 1086, 190 N.E.2d 423, 240 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1963).
38 See generally N.Y. REAL PRop. TAx LAW art. 7 for the provisions
relating to judicial review of tax assessments.
39 LEz & LEFoRsrSa, REvmv & REDuc oN oF REAL PROPERTY AssEss-
MExNrs § 2:07 (1960). For a complete list of local filing dates see id. at§ 2:12.
40 N.Y. REAL PRop. TAx LAW § 706.4 1 LEE & LEFoRm-sR, op. cit. supra note 39, at § 2:14.
42N.Y. REAL PRop. TAX LAW § 706. See also Lan & LxFoanSmnR, op.
cit. supra note 39, at § 3:15.4
-
3 People ex rel. Interstate Land Holding Co. v. Purdy, 236 N.Y. 609,
142 N.E. 303 (1923).
44 15 App. Div. 2d 153, 163, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786, 795 (1st Dept 1961).
45M. at 163-64, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 795-96. The court explained that its
ruling did not imply that there is one value for condemnation and another
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Conclusion
Assessed valuations are fixed by public officials charged with
the duty of placing a fair market value on all realty in a district.
The assessor is an expert who generally has no knowledge of,
or interest in, the condemnation litigation. There would thus
appear to be no objection to the admission of assessed value as
some evidence of market value to be considered with all other
factors. Yet, various rationales have been used by courts to prevent
its admission.
The objections that the evidence is hearsay or res inter alios
acta"4 are not substantial. The assessor is a public official; his
acts are presumptively valid and the assessment rolls are public
records, entitled to confidence without cross-examination. As a
public official, the assessor acts for some branch of local or state
government and thus may frequently be identified with the con-
demnor, even if the condemnor is a non-governmental body which
has been delegated eminent domain powers.
As a limitation on its general admissibility, it must be recognized
that when the property owner has not participated in the assessment,
assessed value should not be used against him. If he does object
or affirmatively assents to the assessment, it is held to be an
admissible declaration against interest. However, if the assessed
value is less than market value, the owner cannot reasonably be
expected to object. It is doubtful that courts would impose a
duty to question a favorable valuation or that the imposition of
such a duty would encourage owners, other than those with
property likely to be condemned, to object.
Nevertheless, it seems unfair to admit the assessed valuation
as a declaration against interest by the condemnee without similarly
permitting it to be introduced by him as a declaration against
interest on the part of the condemnor. This anomalous conclusion
is frequently justified by the holding that the assessor, acting for
tax purposes, may not circumscribe the public interest in condem-
nation awards. 47 But, assessed value is already generally admissible
against the condemnor to impeach or contradict witnesses, es-
pecially the assessor himself. It would seem fair to allow the
owner to introduce evidence of assessed value against the condemnor,
both in cross-examination and directly. This approach would not
be inimical to the public interest, for the public interest is that
for taxation. It declared that "value is the same regardless of the nature of
the proceeding. However the same property may have different values at
different times." Id. at 163, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 795-96.
46 It has been recognized that there are many exceptions to the res inter
alios acta rule. See Brinkley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 S.W.2d 423 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959).
4 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, srupra note 23.
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NOTES
the property owner receive just compensation. Furthermore,
if such a position is adopted, assessed value does not bind the
condemnor; it is merely used as some evidence of value for the
consideration of the trier of fact.
In jurisdictions in which there is no requirement that property
be assessed at market value or where the inaccuracy of assessments
has been statistically proven, refusal to admit assessed value seems
justified. The courts in such jurisdictions are forced to utilize
rules of evidence to compensate for this inadequate assessment
procedure. Statutory re-evaluation of both assessment and its
admissability is necessary in such jurisdictions. But, in jurisdictions
in which the assessment relates to market value, assessed value
may be given the weight to which an act of a public official is
entitled. A recent assessment is a disinterested statement by an
expert and may be an invaluable assistance in the determination
of just compensation.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INSOLVENCY -
A REAPPRAISAL
Equity courts have long imposed rather narrow restrictions
on the availability of specific performance as a remedy for breach
of contract. These restrictions are controlled by the concept of
the adequacy of the remedy at law. The plaintiff's prayer for
specific performance depends for its success on his ability to
demonstrate that the remedy at law is, in fact, inadequate. Showing
the uniqueness of the subject matter of the contract or the speculative
character of the damages is usually sufficient to demonstrate such
inadequacy. However, the insolvency of the defendant has generally
not been accepted as a sufficient basis. It will be the purpose of
this note to examine the soundness of this position and to explore
the possibility of arriving at a more satisfactory alternative.
Specific Performance in General
Specific performance of a breached contract has long been
considered by courts of equity to be an exceptional remedy, as
contrasted to the ordinary relief of money damages. This attitude
reflects the general character of equitable relief as complementary
and supplementary to relief at law.' It has been the historical
function of courts of equity to provide an injured party with an
effective remedy only in those cases where the remedy at law is
'WALsir, EQ rry 22-26 (1930).
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